Due to the continuous recording of forwarding states, Information-centric networking (ICN) introduces a new security threat named interest flooding attack. To mitigate this attack, most of the existing works focus on the detecting accuracy. However, we find another important factor that the detecting delay may result in long-term memory occupation. In this letter, aiming to balance the detecting accuracy and delay, we propose an m-list table-based attack detecting (mTBAD) solution to minimize the detecting delay while guaranteeing the accuracy. Particularly, mTBAD maintains an m-list table for malicious Interests entries by combining the disabling PIT exhaustion (DPE) and the negative acknowledgments (NACK). A lightweight monitor is equipped to issue m-NACK packets to inform the attacked router and update its m-list. Extensive simulations based on the GÉANT topology demonstrate that mTBAD reduces the detecting delay by 99.5% (from 280 to 1.2 milliseconds) compared with a state-of-the-art mechanism, at the expense of a very slight loss regarding the false negative rate and the false positive rate. It proves that mTBAD can guarantee the detecting accuracy as well as to prevent long-term memory occupation.
INTRODUCTION
Information-centric networking (ICN) is a clean-slate Internet paradigm, which is expected to overcome the existing problems in the current Internet by using location-independent naming, in-network caching, and name-based routing. 1 ICN has derived many different proposals. Typically, the Interest-based ICN is one of the most popular state-of-the-art paradigms, which adopts the consumer-driven and pull-based delivery pattern. Named data networking (NDN) is the representative of Interest-based ICN. (2, 3) As a common feature, Interest-based ICN owns two types of packets: Interest packet and Data packet. Once a consumer wants to request some content, he issues Interests and the potential producer returns Data. On the other hand, there are three entities, cache storage (CS), pending Interest table (PIT), and forward information base (FIB). The CS is used to cache the received contents; the PIT holds the Interest arrival interface to ensure the received Data back to the requester reversely; the FIB guides routers to forward Interests to potential matching data producer.
Different from the traditional security issues, Interest-based ICN introduces Interest flooding attacks (IFA). (4) (5) (6) Particularly, attackers issue many fake Interests to request nonexisting Data, such that the legitimate Interests could not be responded immediately. Furthermore, owing to content retrieval and stateful forwarding, the IFA attacks lead to the memory overflow and the denial of service (DoS). 7 Recently, there have been many countermeasures to mitigate the attacks. (8) (9) (10) Our previous work disabling PIT exhaustion (DPE) alleviates IFA by separating the malicious traffic states from PIT. 9 Dai et al. 10 proposed a rate-limit mechanism to detect IFA using expiration rate and mitigate the attacks by issuing a packet to force attackers into reducing their sending rate. The existing works mentioned above have greatly improved the accuracy of detecting IFA. However, all these research did not consider the detecting delay, which gravely leads to a long-term memory occupation. Therefore, this letter aims to prevent the long-term memory occupation as well as to guarantee the detecting accuracy.
In this letter, we highlight the importance of detecting a delay in the IFA defense, and design a lightweight m-list table-based attack detecting (mTBAD) mechanism to balance the detecting accuracy and detecting delay. The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We investigate the main cause of detecting delay and propose the mTBAD mechanism, which maintains an m-list to record malicious Interests entries by combining the DPE and the negative acknowledgments (NACK). 2. We design a lightweight monitor to issue m-NACK packets. It is deployed at a producer to recognize the attacks quickly, then issues m-NACK packets to inform attacked routers and update its m-list. 3. We prove that mTBAD is effective and owns a small delay theoretically. We also implement mTBAD mechanism and evaluate its performance in GÉANT topology. The results show mTBAD achieves superior performance compared with a state-of-the-art mechanism.
This letter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some analysis and describes the mTBAD solution in details. Section 3 evaluates the performance of mTBAD. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 4.
ANALYSIS AND SOLUTION
In this section, we compare the metrics of accuracy with delay, and analyze which one is a more critical role in detecting IFA. Furthermore, we present the mTBAD mechanism to decrease detecting delay.
The cause of detecting delay
Once a consumer wants to request some content, he issues Interests which would be processed and forwarded when they arrive at a router. 12 First, the router matches them with a local cache, if there is the requested Data, then directly issues the Data using the Interests arrival face. Second, the router matches the Interests with PIT when there does not cache the requested Data. Furthermore, if other users requested the same Data, the router only adds the Interests arrival face into the PIT and does not forward the Interests to other routers; otherwise, the router creates a corresponding entry whose lifetime is maintained by a specific timer. Finally, the router matches with FIB and forward the Interests to other routers based on some strategies.
The timer, which continuously records the time waiting for the Data reversing from a producer, is owned by the entry and its default value is 2 seconds. 13 Furthermore, the entry occupies the PIT memory until the time is running out or the Interests is acknowledged. 12 In other words, the malicious entries would not be recognized by state-of-the-art mechanisms until the time is running out. Therefore, the timer is the leading culprit of delay in detection.
The mTBAD mechanism
The mTBAD mechanism collaborates DPE with NACK to achieve ultra-low total detecting delay. Figure 1 demonstrates mTBAD forwarding process. In which CS, PIT, and FIB are the same as those in original Interest-based ICN. Moreover, m-list and packet-marking are the same as those in DPE mechanism. However, the difference is that the mTBAD mechanism maintains m-list using m-NACK packets while DPE maintains m-list by counting Interest expiration rate. Furthermore, m-NACK is inspired by rate-limit and NACK. In contrast to these works, m-NACK has malicious entry field and could be applied to update m-list. The last but most important one in mTBAD is the monitor, which is deployed at a producer because the producer could recognize the attacks quickly using its specific OnInterest Inspection method, and it can issue m-NACK packets when malicious Interests are detected. Particularly, the OnInterest Inspection method is an attribute of the producer class. It will be called every time a new Interest arrives. Using such method, the producer find out the arrival Interest could be satisfied or unsatisfied, and recognize the attacks quickly.
Particularly, on one hand, when an Interest arrives at a router, first the router matches it with local cache, then matches it with m-list, third lookups PIT, and finally forward the Interest to other routers with the help of FIB. Such a process is the same as what it does in DPE, however, in the mTBAD mechanism, a producer has a monitor which detects malicious Interests in time. Furthermore, when the monitor receives the Interest, it judges whether the Interest can be satisfied, if yes, it issues responding Data. Otherwise, the monitor regards the Interest as malicious one and sends m-NACK labeled with malicious entry filed to inform attacked routers. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of detecting the attacks. On the other hand, when a Data arrives at a router, the router process the Data just like what it does in DPE mechanism. However, when an m-NACK arrives at the router, first the router identifies m-NACK, then extracts malicious entry field from m-NACK, finally adds a malicious entry +NACK with Malicious Entry field.
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In the above equation, Delay is the expired time of the malicious Interests, and Data packet size is the size of the returning Data packet. Moreover, the second term in Equation (1) (1) is zero, and the total detecting delay can be formalized as follows:
Rate-limit mechanism detects IFA according to the expiration rate and mitigates the attacks by issuing a packet to force attackers into reducing their sending rate. Therefore, in this case, the total detecting delay can be formalized as follows: NACK mechanism mitigates IFA by generating a spoof Data. Different from DPE, NACK does not wait for malicious Interests expiring. Thus, in this case, the first term in Equation (1) is zero, and the total detecting delay can be formalized as follows:
The mTBAD mechanism collaborates DPE with NACK, it detects IFA using a monitor which we have introduced in subsection C and maintains m-list using m-NACK packet. The same as NACK, mTBAD mechanism does not wait for malicious Interests expiring. However, mTBAD can quickly recognize subsequent malicious Interests using m-list while NACK mechanism lacks this ability. Therefore, in this case, the total detecting delay can be formalized as follows:
We can calculate Equations (2, 3, 4, and 5) using assumption above, and achieve the results (listed in Table 1 ). It is evident that mTBAD mechanism has the least total delay compared with other state-of-the-art mechanisms. □
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the mTBAD mechanism compared with the state-of-the-art mechanisms. The experiments are built on the ndnSIM, which is a platform based on NS-3. The experiment is carried out in a large-scale GÉANT topology. 15 The topology has 40 nodes and 59 links. It has five types of link bandwidth (from 155 Mbps to 20 Gbps). Based on this topology, we select the nodes whose degree is one as the clients (9 such nodes in total). Among them, we randomly choose 4 client nodes as the attackers, other 4 client nodes as legitimate users, and a client node as a content provider. Other experimental parameters are shown in Table 2 . 1) Delay: Experimental results are shown in Figures 2a, 2b , and 2c. To compare the performance of mTBAD with rate-limit, DPE, and NACK mechanisms, we implement these three state-of-the-art mechanisms, where the detection threshold is set to 200 items per second. It can be seen from all figures that PIT cardinality of each router is getting smaller and smaller in 0 to 10 seconds. There are two reasons casing the PIT cardinality decrease. First, some incoming Interests could be satisfied without matching with PIT because routers cache some Data, and achieve the requested Data along the reverse path. In this case, PIT cardinality does not increase. Second, some Interests entries already exist in the PIT, and are not added to the PIT. Instead, their arrival interface is inserted into the PIT. Therefore, PIT cardinality does not increase.
When IFA launches at the 10th second, PIT cardinality of all routers spurt except SE node (We denote UK as the United Kingdom, SE as Sweden and ES as Spain.), because connected clients are legitimate users. Moreover, as shown in Figures 2a  and 2b , the PIT cardinality increases significantly and meets the threshold quickly. The mTBAD mechanism can realize the attacks earlier (red line in the figure), so that the PIT cardinality stops to increase earlier. The NACK mechanism mitigates IFA by generating a spoof Data, so the PIT cardinality (green line in the figure) also stops to increase. However, the PIT cardinality is more extensive than it in the mTBAD mechanism, because mTBAD has an m-list to record malicious entries while NACK does not. On one hand, DPE and rate-limit (blue and black lines) spend 3 seconds to realize the attacks, which is greatly slower than the mTBAD mechanism. Particularly, it takes 2 seconds for malicious entries to be expired because most of the malicious Interests are never satisfied, and takes another 1 second for the expiration rate of those entries to reach the threshold. (9, 10) Therefore, it takes 3 seconds for routers detecting the attacks. On the other hand, DPE and rate-limit mechanisms take a few time (donate as t 1 , t 2 respectively) to reduce PIT cardinality below the threshold after realizing the attacks. We can conclude that the mTBAD mechanism spends less time to recovery from the attacks than the other two mechanisms, and DPE is better than rate-limit.
2) Accuracy: To further compare the performance of mTBAD, NACK, DPE, and rate-limit mechanisms, we evaluate the four mechanisms regarding false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR). The malicious Interest rate is set to 50 to 350 per second randomly, updated every 5 seconds. Experimental duration is 500 seconds.
From Figures 3a and 3b , we can observe that, in case of mTBAD and NACK, the data lines are close to zero because the two mechanisms detect IFA using a producer Unsatisfied method. In other words, their FNR and FPR are ultra low. On one hand, the three solid lines are coincident because DPE detects the attacks according to the expired entry number under each prefix. Compared with DPE, mTBAD decreases FNR from approximately 52% to 0.1%. Furthermore, compared with the rate-limit, mTBAD decreases FNR from approximately 15% to 0.15%. On the other hand, there are no false positives in DPE from e = 0.001 to e = 0.1 (Note that "e" refers to the packet loss rate). However, the three solid lines rise sharply because the rate-limit mechanism performs an extreme action which considers all the unsatisfied Interests as the wicked ones. This extreme action leads FPR increasing to approximately 95% when the packet loss rate is 0.1. Based on the above analysis, mTBAD is an effective way to detect attacks accurately.
3) Cost and effect: We also compared the performance of mTBAD, NACK, DPE, and rate-limit regarding the total delay and the total control-plane packets. The experimental results are shown in Figure 3b . Notably, the total delay denotes an effect obtained by applying a specific mechanism, while the number of control-plane packets is regarded as a cost. The control-plane packets are issued in control plane to maintain malicious entry table or inform an IFA event. On one hand, mTBAD has the least total delay, which is about 1.208 milliseconds, while DPE and rate-limit take 4670 and 6060 milliseconds to realize the IFA event, respectively. Furthermore, even though the malicious Interests have the same name prefix, NACK has to generate many spoof Data for each malicious Interest. Therefore, NACK also takes more time than the mTBAD to identify the attacks.
That is, in the mTBAD, the total detecting delay can reduce by 99.5% (from 280 to 1.2 milliseconds). On the other hand, the mTBAD has a low cost, that is, only requiring 4 control-plane packets to maintain the m-list. As a comparison, NACK has to issue 4640 packets to inform that the attacks have occurred, which requires a longer time than the one of mTBAD. Besides, DPE and rate-limit do not issue too many control-plane packets due to identifying IFA by the data rate of an interface.
Based on the above analysis, mTBAD can minimize the detecting delay while guaranteeing the accuracy. What's more, it has a lower cost by comparing with the state-of-the-art mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
To mitigate IFA, most of the existing works focus on the detecting accuracy. However, this letter finds another important factor, detecting delay, where a long detecting delay results in long-term memory occupation. Because the detecting accuracy and detecting delay are important, we proposed a lightweight mTBAD to balance the detecting accuracy and detecting delay. Such solution can detect the IFA attacks quickly while guaranteeing the accuracy. Particularly, the mTBAD mechanism maintains an m-list to record malicious Interests entries and issues m-NACK packets to inform the attacked routers and update its m-list. Experimental results show that the mTBAD has an ultra-low total delay, high accuracy, and low cost in mitigating the attacks.
In our future work, we will further explore the lower limit of delay to detect the attacks, and further analyze the pros vs cons of introducing producer-generated NACKS.
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